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Abstract
Given the rapid rise of electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, and the ambitious targets
set for the near future, the management of large EV fleets must be seen as a priority.
Specifically, we study a scenario where EV charging is managed through self-interested
EV aggregators who compete in the day-ahead market in order to purchase the electricity
needed to meet their clients’ requirements. In order to reduce electricity costs and lower
the impact on electricity markets, a centralised bidding coordination framework has been
proposed in the literature employing a coordinator. In order to improve privacy and limit
the need for the coordinator, we propose a reformulation of the coordination framework
as a decentralised algorithm, employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM). However, given the self-interested nature of the aggregators, they can deviate
from the algorithm in order to improve their personal utility. Hence, we study strategic
manipulation of the ADMM algorithm and, in doing so, describe and analyse different
attack vectors and propose a mathematical framework to quantify and detect manipulation.
Moreover, this detection framework is not limited the considered EV scenario and can
be applied to general ADMM algorithms. Finally, we test the proposed decentralised
coordination and manipulation detection algorithms in realistic scenarios using real market
and driver data from Spain. Our empirical results show the convergence of the coordination
algorithm, and that the detection algorithm accurately detects deviating behaviour in up
to 96% of the cases.
1. Introduction
To date, there exists a world-wide fleet of more than two million electric vehicles (EVs),
combining purely electrical and hybrid (International Energy Agency, 2017). Furthermore,
EV sales are growing exponentially in most countries and there are targets to achieve 50
to 200 million of EVs at a global scale in the next decade (International Energy Agency,
2016). These high penetration targets aim to reduce the use of fossil fuels and improve
environmental conditions. However, the transition from conventional to electric vehicles is
not without challenges (Rigas, Ramchurn, & Bassiliades, 2015). Specifically, compared to
traditional fuel powered vehicles, EVs present a novel and heavy strain to existing electricity
networks, which will need to accommodate a new type of consumer with high demand.
In order to deal with this challenge, the last decade has seen the introduction of the
concept of the EV aggregator (Kempton, Tomic, Letendre, Brooks, & Lipman, 2001): an
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intermediary between a fleet of EVs and the electricity grid and markets. The aggregator
is able to control the charging of its fleet, and this way informed collective decisions can be
made. In contrast with individual EV operation, the much higher degree of coordination
possible when a fleet is centrally managed by an aggregator offers great benefits. For
example, electricity consumption to charge the fleet’s batteries can be spread over time,
avoiding expensive and polluting demand peaks. In particular, in this work we focus on
EV aggregators participating in day-ahead markets, in order to purchase the electricity
needed to meet their clients’ energy requirements. In more detail, day-ahead markets match
electricity supply and demand on an hourly basis (see Section 3), and are the main source of
wholesale electricity. Here, increased electricity demand means increased prices, resulting
in the so-called price impact, and hence it is in every market participant’s interest to avoid
unnecessary demand peaks.
In this work we focus on a scenario where different EV aggregators co-exist in the same
day-ahead market. These aggregators may vary in nature and size, but it is reasonable to
assume that they are self-interested. Indeed, reduced electricity costs translate into more
profit for the aggregator and/or more benefits for their EV fleet. In this scenario, reduced
overall costs can be achieved by inter-aggregator coordination, producing more informed
and optimised bidding. This coordination problem has been studied in the literature un-
der a centralised algorithm by employing a centralised coordinator (Perez-Diaz, Gerding,
& McGroarty, 2018b, 2018c). However, this centralised approach requires a trusted envi-
ronment where the participating aggregators report their private information to the central
coordinator. In a realistic scenario, self-interested aggregators would be reluctant to share
their private business information, thus presenting an important drawback to the proposed
centralised approaches.
In order to address this shortcoming, we propose a novel decentralised mechanism which
allows the coordination of the EV aggregators without the need of a trusted coordinator,
and without revealing their private requirement information. Specifically, we reformulate
the centralised optimisation algorithm proposed by Perez-Diaz et al. (2018b) using the
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), which decomposes the optimisation
problem into smaller problems coordinated through an aggregation step (Boyd, Parikh,
Chu, Peleato, & Eckstein, 2010). Moreover, in order to provide transparency and remove
the need for trust, the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a blockchain, using smart
contracts in a very similar vein as the work by Munsing, Mather, and Moura (2017).
Although our proposed decentralised algorithm tackles the shortcoming described above,
it introduces a new challenge. Specifically, in the decentralised case, the agents directly
impact the computation of the optimal energy allocation, which introduces the possibility of
strategic manipulation by deviating from the vanilla ADMM algorithm, in order to influence
and modify the algorithm’s outcome. This, given that the aggregators are rational and self-
interested, would happen whenever they perceive an increase in their personal utility by
cheating. In order to tackle this problem, we describe how an aggregator can strategically
modify its local computation in order to improve its personal gains, and how the coordinator
can monitor the aggregators with a strategic manipulation detection algorithm, and penalise
deviators accordingly. Specifically, we provide three attack vectors which either seek to
improve an aggregator’s own energy allocation, or to incriminate another benign aggregator
as deviator. We would like to remark that this issue exists in any ADMM (or variants)
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decentralised optimisation scenario, where self-interested agents can try to manipulate and
influence the outcome of the algorithm, and is in no way limited to EV or smart grid studies.
In consequence, although we use the EV domain as a concrete example, the manipulation
detection methods are generic and applicable to any ADMM setting. Note that this study
on ADMM manipulation differs from existing literature as existing works only consider
external attackers and noise injection, instead of self-interested insider manipulation (see
Section 2.3 for more information).
In more detail, this paper makes the following contributions to the state of the art:
• We propose the first decentralised optimisation algorithm for the coordination of self-
interested EV aggregator participation in day-ahead markets.
• We present the first study of strategic manipulation of the ADMM algorithm, where
a self-interested agent can try to modify the algorithm’s outcome for its own benefit.
• We propose a detection algorithm to monitor the participating agents and find devi-
ations form the vanilla ADMM algorithm.
• We present a realistic case study to empirically evaluate both the decentralised coor-
dination and detection algorithms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 introduces the considered
day-ahead market and the mathematical formalism to quantify price impact. Section 4
details the considered EV aggregators and presents the proposed decentralised optimisation
algorithm using ADMM. Next, a strategic manipulation study of the proposed ADMM
algorithm is detailed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the proposed mathematical formalism
to detect strategic manipulation of the ADMM algorithm. Next, an empirical evaluation of
the proposed algorithms using real market and driver data is detailed in Section 7. Finally,
we conclude in Section 8. A preliminary version of this paper was presented in (Perez-Diaz,
Gerding, & McGroarty, 2018a).
2. Literature Review
This paper builds upon existing literature in different fields, as detailed in this section.
2.1 Multi-Aggregator Scenarios
A small body of the literature addresses related multi-EV aggregator scenarios, as described
below. (Qi, Xu, Shen, Hu, & Song, 2014; Shao, Wang, Wang, Du, & Wang, 2016) studies the
hierarchical control of EV fleets where different aggregators are coordinated by a high-level
coordinator. However, in their models the aggregators are not self-interested, and instead
the authors focus on accommodating grid constraints and ensuring driver satisfaction. More
related to our considered scenario, Yu, Lin, Lam, and Li (2016) study a setup where a num-
ber of EV aggregators can trade energy among them in order to fix forecasting deviations,
instead of purchasing the energy from the grid. Although this is shown to improve the
aggregators’ energy costs, the authors do not consider price impact in their model and each
aggregator performs independently. Another related work can be found in (Mukherjee &
Gupta, 2017). Their work considers a scenario where several private aggregators are present
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in a given city, and negotiate with each other in order to balance charging in the different
limitedly available charging stations. The aim is to maximise the total number of EVs
charged and the profit of the EV aggregators and their results indicate that coordinated
operation improves the profit of the EV aggregators and the services offered to the drivers.
Moreover, in a similar vein to our work, Wu, Shahidehpour, Alabdulwahab, and Abusorrah
(2016) study a multi-aggregator day-ahead bidding scenario and apply game theory to find
Nash equilibria. In more detail, each aggregator tries to categorise the other aggregators
and thus forecast their day-ahead bids, and adjust their bidding accordingly. However, after
introducing several approximations in order to simplify the model’s structure, the proposed
model depends on a complicated optimisation algorithm and does not guarantee existence
of Nash equilibria. Finally, the same scenario considered in this paper is studied from a
centralised perspective in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c). In these works, a number of
self-interested aggregators perform coordinated bidding under the control of a centralised
coordinator, and different payment mechanisms which incentivise cooperation rather than
strategic manipulation are studied, using mechanism design and cooperative game theory,
respectively. However, as discussed in Section 1, these centralised approaches require the
aggregators to report all their private information to the coordinator, data that private en-
tities would be reluctant to provide. In order to tackle this issue, the decentralised approach
proposed in this paper removes the need for full information sharing, allowing coordination
by revealing much less private information.
2.2 Decentralised Management in the Smart Grid
Decentralised optimisation techniques have been widely applied in smart grid and power
systems scenarios. In more detail, there is a body of literature studying decentralised
charging scheduling of EVs (Ardakanian, Keshav, & Rosenberg, 2014; Wen, Chen, Teng, &
Member, 2012; Gan, Topcu, & Low, 2013; Ma, Callaway, & Hiskens, 2013; Le Floch, Belletti,
Saxena, Bayen, & Moura, 2015; Le Floch, Belletti, & Moura, 2016). Overall, these works
consider the problem of scheduling the charging of EVs in different decentralised fashions,
considering each EV as a individual node in their respectively proposed algorithms. In
more detail, (Ardakanian et al., 2014) focuses on physical grid constraints, considering an
electricity network managed by different access points, and its interaction with a fleet of EVs.
Similarly, (Gan et al., 2013; Ma et al., 2013) consider decentralised valley-filling algorithms,
where the aim is to flatten demand over time, and each EV sequentially updates its own
charging schedule by iterative interaction with a central utility company. In a related vein,
(Wen et al., 2012) considers a decentralised algorithm which employs discrete time intervals
and selects subsets of EVs to be charged at each time interval, by iterative communication
between each EV and their aggregator. Finally, (Le Floch et al., 2015, 2016) considers
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) scenarios, where the EVs are able to inject energy back to the grid
when needed. Although all these works study different aspects of EV charging scheduling
under decentralised algorithms, they do not consider the interaction among different self-
interested aggregators, which is one of the aims of this paper.
Furthermore, decentralised algorithms have been employed in many non-EV related
smart grid publications. As discussed in Section 1, an algorithm that has acquired great
popularity in recent years due to its versatility and great convergence properties is ADMM
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(Boyd et al., 2010). It has been employed in multitude of smart grid studies, such as power
flow (Wang, Wu, & Wang, 2017; Sulc, Backhaus, & Chertkov, 2014; Peng & Low, 2014;
Scott & Thie´baux, 2014) and micro-grid (Munsing et al., 2017) scenarios. However, this
algorithm (or variants) has not been employed to study the decentralised coordination of
self-interested aggregators.
2.3 Manipulation of ADMM algorithms
As described in the previous subsection, decentralised optimisation algorithms are widely
used, not only in smart grid related studies, but in most technical fields. The reasons range
from better scaling to large problem sizes to privacy preservation. There is, however, a gap
between the introduction of such algorithms and the study of their robustness to potential
manipulative/malicious attacks (Munsing & Moura, 2018). Specifically, in contrast with
centralised algorithms, in the decentralised case, each node or agent participating in the
algorithm will perform part of the calculations, or will transmit messages to a coordinator,
hence the possibilities of cyber-attack or manipulation increase. In order to address these
important issues, a few works have been published in recent years studying related topics,
which will be described next. Note that we focus on ADMM algorithms, but the findings
of all these studies should be generalizable to other iterative decentralised optimisation
methods.
Following (Munsing & Moura, 2018), we can classify this literature based on the em-
ployed technique:
• Round-robin techniques (Liao & Chakrabortty, 2016, 2017): these techniques seek to
identify compromised nodes by replacing the coordination step of the ADMM algo-
rithm by a round-robin detection algorithm which compares the proposals of different
subsets of nodes in order to identify discrepancies. Once corrupted nodes have been
identified, the coordinator switches back to the ADMM algorithm.
• Filtering techniques (Liao & Chakrabortty, 2018): these techniques do not try to
identify compromised nodes, but to employ robust statistics and outlier detection
techniques in order to accurately compute the desired global quantities even in the
presence of malignant data.
• Non-linear weighting techniques (Chen, Kar, & Moura, 2018): similarly to filtering
techniques, these techniques also do not try to identify compromised nodes. Instead,
they employ data from all nodes, but introduce weights to scale down the impact of
suspicious nodes.
• Convexity techniques (Munsing & Moura, 2018): these techniques detects compro-
mised nodes and false-data injection in convex algorithms by checking for convexity
violations.
Overall, these works focus on cyber-security, i.e. the effects of external attacks which
compromise an internal node (a participant in the ADMM algorithm). Moreover, the papers
discussed above focus on random noise injection by a malignant agent, which prevents the
algorithm from converging. In contrast, in this work, we study strategic manipulation of the
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ADMM algorithm by internal self-interested agents. In more detail, rather than considering
external malignant attackers, we consider algorithm participants that want to achieve more
beneficial outcomes for themselves, even if this is in detriment of the other participants,
and deviate from the vanilla ADMM algorithm in order to do so. This differs from these
existing works in two aspects: (i) the algorithm can still converge to a stable outcome, (ii)
the manipulating agents will use clever cheating techniques, as injecting random noise will
not be beneficial for them.
3. The Day-Ahead Market
This section details the day-ahead market structure considered in this paper and present
in most countries. Moreover, we discuss how to quantify the price impact of buy orders
(electricity demand), which is an important aspect of our work. The exposition in this
section follows (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c).
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Figure 1: (a) Aggregated supply and demand curves, and market clearing mechanism. (b)
Price impact of a buy order with volume E and maximum price pmax. (c) Final
price function P(E). Source: OMIE, 01/11/2016, 11th hour.
Day-ahead markets divide each day into 24 hourly slots, each running a separate uniform-
priced double-sided auction. Before closure time (usually noon) on day D, bids and offers
for each hourly slot of day D + 1 must be submitted to the market. Then, a matching
algorithm determines the accepted bids and offers, and establishes an hourly uniform price
using marginal pricing, this is, the price of the intersection between supply and demand.
Bids (buy orders) and offers (sell orders) for each hourly slot are quantity-price pairs.
For bids (offers), the price represents the highest (lowest) price the participant is willing to
pay (sell for). As is common in most markets, we define a minimum price pmin = 0 and
some maximum price, pmax. After closure time, the auctioneer aggregates all buy and sell
orders, by high-price and low-price priorities, respectively. This generates the aggregated
demand and supply curves, and their intersection determines the accepted orders and the
resulting uniform price, as depicted in Fig. 1 (a).
Clearly, the arrival of a new buy order pushes the clearing price up if it gets accepted
(i.e. if it lies towards the left-hand side of the intersection). Fig. 1 (b) illustrates the effect
of a new buy order with quantity E placed at price pmax. The price increase (price impact)
depends on the new order’s price and quantity, and on the supply and demand curves. Price
impact is an essential market characteristic associated with large market participants, and
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careful managing is required to avoid pushing prices up unnecessarily. Price impact has
been studied in the electricity markets literature by employing residual curves (Herranz,
Mun˜oz San Roque, Villar, & Campos, 2012; Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c, 2018a), which
are detailed below.
Employing standard notation, for any given hour t, let Dt(p) and St(p) be the aggregated
demand and supply curves respectively, as a function of price, p. The residual supply curve
is defined as Rt(p) = St(p)−Dt(p) = E, and represents the amount of energy, E, an agent
could bid for while maintaining a clearing price p. Conversely, the clearing price when
bidding a quantity E is given by p = R−1t (E). Introducing the notation Pt(E) = R−1t (E),
the clearing price when the new agent bids an amount E is p = Pt(E), and the price impact
∆p of this order is given by ∆p = Pt(E)− Pt(0), where Pt(0) represents the base price at
hour t, i.e. the price without the agent’s new bid. This formalism is depicted in Figs. 1 (b)
and (c).
We are now ready to introduce the EV aggregator model considered in this paper and
the optimal day-ahead bidding algorithm.
4. Optimal Multi-EV Aggregator Participation in the Day-Ahead Market
As discussed in Section 1, an EV aggregator is responsible for the charging of a fleet of EVs
and, to this end, purchases the required electricity from the day-ahead market (see Section
3). We will start by describing the considered aggregator structure and operation. Then,
we will describe the optimal bidding algorithm proposed in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c,
2018a) and how it can be used to optimise the bidding of a group of EV aggregators with
a central coordinator. Finally, we will decompose this centralised algorithm into a decen-
tralised optimisation algorithm by using the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM), as discussed in Section 1.
4.1 EV Aggregator Model
In our model, following (Bessa, Matos, Soares, & Lopes, 2012; Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b,
2018c, 2018a), EVs arrive and depart dynamically over time. When an EV i arrives to
the charging point, it communicates the desired departure time, tid, and desired state of
charge at departure, SoCid, to the aggregator. We assume that arrival time and state
of charge, ti0 and SoC
i
0 can be automatically inferred by the aggregator. Each EV has a
maximum charging speed, P imax in kW, which depends on two factors: the available physical
infrastructure, and the EV’s battery. The charging schedule of the EV is then left at the
aggregator’s discretion, which can choose when to perform the charging while guaranteeing
the desired state of charge by departure time. This flexibility allows charging the battery
in an informed way, rather than randomly, or at arrival, providing cheaper electricity costs.
Due to the nature of the day-ahead market, electricity bids need to be placed between
12 and 36 hours before delivery time (assuming market closure at noon, see Section 3). This
requires the market participants to forecast their electricity needs, as described next, and
bid accordingly.
Following (Bessa et al., 2012; Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c, 2018a), we model the
requirements of an EV i by employing two vectors with 24 entries each, rmin,i and rmax,i.
Specifically, rmin,it is the amount of energy needed at hour t assuming charging has been
7
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left for the last possible moment and that the charging requirements need to be fulfilled.
Conversely, rmax,it is the amount of energy needed at hour t assuming charging starts as
soon as possible. For example, consider an EV arriving at 3pm, stating 9pm departure time
and 8kWh charging needs with Pmax = 3kW. Then, r
min,i would be as specified in Table
1. Specifically, if 6pm is reached with no charging done, at least 2kW of energy needs to
be charged between 6-7pm in order to fulfil the EV driver requirements. The same applies
with 3kW between 7-8pm and 8-9pm. Similarly, for the same scenario, the requirement
vector rmax,i would be as specified in Table 2.
Then, in order to provide mathematical tractability, two global energy requirement
vectors, Rmin and Rmax, can be obtained by summing the hourly requirements of all the EVs
associated to the particular aggregator, i.e. Rmint =
∑N
i=1 r
min,i
t and R
max
t =
∑N
i=1 r
max,i
t .
Note that these aggregated constraints do not exactly capture the individual requirements
of each EV, but have been widely employed in the literature (Bessa et al., 2012; Bessa &
Matos, 2013a, 2013b; Gonzalez Vaya & Andersson, 2015; Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c,
2018a). The reasons are the fact that considering constraints for each individual EV renders
the problem unfeasible with moderate problem sizes, and the fact that bidding uses day-
ahead price and energy requirements forecasts, which will not be exact anyway.
We will denote the quantities that need to be forecasted with a hat: hourly energy
requirements, Rˆmint and Rˆ
max
t , hourly number of available EVs, Nˆt, and hourly price impact
functions, Pˆt.
rmin,i3 r
min,i
4 r
min,i
5 r
min,i
6 r
min,i
7 r
min,i
8 r
min,i
9
0 0 0 2 3 3 0
Table 1: Example of requirement vector rmin,i
rmax,i3 r
max,i
4 r
max,i
5 r
max,i
6 r
max,i
7 r
max,i
8 r
max,i
9
3 3 2 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Example of requirement vector rmax,i
4.2 Optimal Day-Ahead Bidding Algorithm
Now that the day-ahead and EV aggregator models have been detailed, we are ready to
present the optimal day-ahead bidding algorithm. The algorithm is from (Perez-Diaz et al.,
2018b, 2018c, 2018a) and reproduced here for convenience. The mathematical problem
is defined as follows: given an EV aggregator’s forecasted requirements and price impact
functions, find the optimal distribution of energy quantities to bid across the 24 hourly
slots of the next day, E = (E0, . . . , E23), in order to satisfy its clients’ charging needs while
minimising the total cost of the purchased energy. We assume that the agent’s bids are set
at maximum price, pmax, in order to guarantee execution. Hence only bidding hours and
quantities need to be decided.
As discussed in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b), and in order to avoid a complex minimisa-
tion landscape with multiple minima, the forecasted hourly price impact functions Pˆt (see
Sections 3 and 4.1) are approximated by quadratic convex functions. Specifically, they are
8
Detecting Strategic Manipulation in Distributed Optimisation
given by Pˆconvext = atE2t + btEt + Pˆt(0), where all the coefficients at are restricted to be
positive. Formally, the optimisation algorithm is given by Eqs. (1a), (1b), (1c), (1d). In
more detail, the objective function (1a) minimizes the total cost of the purchased energy.
The constraints guarantee that the amount of purchased energy is enough to satisfy the
forecasted demand (1b), that it is not purchased before the forecasted arrival of the EVs
(1c) and that the energy purchased at each hour is not greater than the amount that the
aggregator is able to charge at the given hour, based on the forecasted number of avail-
able vehicles (the aggregator cannot store energy). It is worth noting that the number of
constraints is always 72, independent on the fleet size. Also, given the convexity of the
problem, there exists a unique global minimum, which we are guaranteed to find.
min
{Et}
∑
t
Pˆt(Et) · Et (1a)
t∑
j=0
Ej ≥
t∑
j=0
Rˆminj , ∀t = 0, . . . , 23 (1b)
t∑
j=0
Ej ≤
t∑
j=0
Rˆmaxj , ∀t = 0, . . . , 23 (1c)
Et/∆t ≤ NˆtPmax , ∀t = 0, . . . , 23 (1d)
4.3 Centralised Joint Bidding
The bidding algorithm detailed in the previous section for a single aggregator can be ex-
tended to perform joint bidding, where a coordinator collects the requirements of a number
of independent aggregators and applies the optimisation algorithm globally. In more detail,
consider a set of n EV aggregators. Then, following (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c, 2018a)
and overloading the variable i, let Rˆmin,it and Rˆ
max,i
t be aggregator i’s forecasted energy re-
quirements for hour t , and Nˆ it the number of available EVs from aggregator i, as specified
in Section 4.2. The combined requirements of all the aggregators are then:
Rˆmint =
n∑
i=1
Rˆmin,it (2) Rˆ
max
t =
n∑
i=1
Rˆmax,it (3) Nˆt =
n∑
i=1
Nˆ it (4)
To find the optimal global energy bids, the bidding optimisation algorithm given by Eqs.
(1a), (1b), (1c), (1d) can be applied with constraints given by the combined requirements
(2), (3) and (4). This will result in obtaining a global day-ahead energy volume Et for each
hour t, which can be then distributed among the n aggregators.
The redistribution mechanism is defined in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b), and allocates
an hourly energy schedule to each participating aggregator after obtaining a global energy
schedule as detailed above. The redistribution problem is as follows. Letting Eit be the
amount of energy allocated to EV aggregator i at time t, we need to find Eit for t = 0, . . . , 23
9
Perez-Diaz, Gerding & McGroarty
and i = 1, . . . , n satisfying the following constraints:
t∑
j=0
Eij ≥
t∑
j=0
Rˆminj , ∀t = 0, . . . , 23; ∀i = 1, . . . , n (5a)
t∑
j=0
Eij ≤
t∑
j=0
Rˆmaxj , ∀t = 0, . . . , 23; ∀i = 1, . . . , n (5b)
Eit/∆t ≤ Nˆ itPmax, ∀t = 0, . . . , 23; ∀i = 1, . . . , n (5c)
n∑
i=1
Eit = Et, ∀t = 0, . . . , 23 (5d)
In this constraint satisfaction problem, Eqs. (5a), (5b), (5c) ensure that each EV ag-
gregator has enough energy to satisfy its requirements, no more, no less, for each hour. Eq.
(5d) makes sure the sums of the allocated hourly energies add up to the available global
energy.
4.4 Decentralised Optimisation Algorithm
We are now ready to introduce the novel decentralised optimisation algorithm based on
ADMM (Boyd et al., 2010). Specifically, our goal is to reformulate the optimisation prob-
lems given by Eqs. (1a), (1b), (1c), (5a), (5b), (5c) as an iterative decentralised algorithm,
where each EV aggregator solves a local optimisation problem. The solutions to each local
problem are coordinated by a global consensus step, and this procedure is iterated. Con-
sensus refers to the fact that, asymptotically, all the local variables will coincide. This
type of algorithm is appropriate in our setting for several reasons: (i) given that our prob-
lem is convex, it is guaranteed to converge to the global optimum (Boyd et al., 2010); (ii)
it enables coordination without the aggregators revealing their energy requirements, i.e.
Rmin and Rmax; (iii) it is particularly well suited for blockchain implementation, provid-
ing transparency and anti-tampering guarantees (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018a; Munsing et al.,
2017).
Following the notation introduced in Section 4.3, recall that Ei =
(
Ei0, . . . , E
i
23
)
denotes
the energy schedule for aggregator i. Moreover, let E =
(
E1, . . . ,En
)
be the joint vector
encapsulating each individual energy schedule, and Eglob =
(
Eglob1 , . . . , E
glob
23
)
be a vector
such that Eglobt =
∑n
i=1E
i
t . We can now rewrite Eq. (1a) as:
min
Eglob
23∑
t=0
Pˆt(Eglobt ) · Eglobt = min
E
23∑
t=0
[
Pˆt
(
n∑
i=1
Eit
)
·
n∑
i=1
Eit
]
=
= min
E
n∑
i=1
 23∑
t=0
Eit · Pˆt
 n∑
j=1
Ejt
 (6)
This way the objective function is expressed as a sum of n terms, as required by the ADMM
formulation (Boyd et al., 2010). Note that, given that the price impact of each aggregator
affects everybody else, we cannot separate Eq. (6) in the variable i, i.e. the equation is
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coupled and the sum’s terms cannot be independently distributed among the aggregators.
This type of problem is suited to be formulated as a global variable consensus problem (Boyd
et al., 2010), which works as follows. Consider a minimisation problem in the following form:
min
x
n∑
i=1
fi(x)
where the goal is that each term in the sum can be handled independently. In the cases
where the variable x is not separable in i, local variables xi and a global variable z can be
introduced, rewriting the problem as:
min
{xi}
n∑
i=1
fi(x
i)
subject to: xi − z = 0, ∀ = 1, . . . , n
As mentioned above, the problem constraints require all local variables to agree with each
other and with the global variable. This way, global consensus on the solution is achieved.
Also, note that any individual constraints can be embedded into each fi.
In a similar vein and focusing on our scenario, let E and E(i) be the global and local
variables respectively, each of which comprises a vector with dimension 24n i.e. E(i) =(
E(i),1, . . . ,E(i),n
)
and E(i),j =
(
E
(i),j
0 , . . . , E
(i),j
23
)
. Following Eq. (6), the functions fi are
given by:
fi
(
E(i)
)
=

∑23
t=0
[
E
(i),i
t · Pˆt
(∑n
j=1E
(i),j
t
)]
,
if constraints (1b), (1c),
(1d) are met by E(i),i
∞ , otherwise
The resulting ADMM algorithm is then given by the following iterative equations:
E
(i)
[k+1] = arg min
E′
(
fi(E
′) + ξ(i) T[k]
(
E′ −E[k]
)
+
ρ
2
‖E′ −E[k]‖22
)
(7a)
E[k+1] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
E
(i)
[k+1] +
1
ρ
ξ
(i)
[k]
)
(7b)
ξ
(i)
[k+1] = ξ
(i)
[k] + ρ
(
E
(i)
[k+1] −E[k+1]
)
(7c)
where the subscript [k] denotes iteration number, and ξ and ρ are the dual variable and the
augmented Lagrangian parameter, respectively (Boyd et al., 2010). Intuitively, ρ controls
the trade-off between each aggregator solving its own local problem, and achieving global
consensus (not necessarily to a minimum point). In more detail, if ρ is set too high, the
algorithm forces consensus too much, resulting in very slow convergence. Conversely, if
ρ is set too small, each aggregator solves its local problem and consensus is not reached.
Examples of this are presented in Section 7.2.
Given this, the iterative algorithm works as follows: first, each EV aggregator solves their
local problem, Eq. (7a), and update their local copy of the energy schedule, E(i). Then, an
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aggregation step, Eq. (7b), collects all the local solutions proposed by each aggregator and
updates the global energy schedule, E, reporting this vector back to all the aggregators.
Lastly, each aggregator updates their local copy of the dual variable, ξ(i), as per Eq. (7c)
and proceeds to the new iteration.
This iterative process is stopped when the primal and dual residuals reach some user-
specified tolerances, pri and dual (Boyd et al., 2010; Munsing et al., 2017). Specifically, the
primal residual is denoted by r[k] =
(
r1[k], . . . , r
n
[k]
)
, where ri[k] = E
(i)
[k] − E[k]. Similarly, the
dual residual is given by s[k] = E[k]−E[k−1]. The stopping criterion then takes the following
form:
‖r[k]‖22 ≤ pri (8a)
‖s[k]‖22 ≤ dual (8b)
and the algorithm stops when both conditions have been met.
This concludes the exposition of the novel decentralised algorithm, which will be em-
pirically tested in Section 7.2. We are now ready to study how the algorithm could be
manipulated by a self-interested agent, and how this can be detected.
5. Strategic Manipulation of the ADMM Algorithm
The ADMM-based algorithm described in the previous section has nice convergence prop-
erties and (asymptotically) reaches the global optimum for suitable values of ρ (Boyd et al.,
2010). However, this requires every participating agent to run the algorithm faithfully. In
our case, where agents are assumed to be self-interested, an aggregator could deviate from
their assigned local algorithm and/or misreport their local solutions if this improves their
allocation. Therefore, in this section we focus on the strategic manipulation of our proposed
ADMM algorithm, Eqs. (7a), (7b), (7c), and we will show how a misbehaving aggregator
can significantly affect the algorithm’s outcome. Note that we do not look at all possible
manipulation vectors, as this is not feasible, but instead focus on three specific types of
manipulation, the so-called proportional, shift and adversarial attacks, selected for their
effectiveness and intuitive behaviour.
5.1 Proportional Attack
In this type of manipulation, the deviating aggregator i runs its local optimisation problem,
Eq. (7b), but changes its local schedule allocation for another aggregator j, E(i),j , by a
factor λ ∈ [0, 1], which indicates the strength of the attack. Formally, E(i)[k+1] is obtained
from Eq. 7b, and then modified as:
Eˆ
(i),j
[k+1] = E
(i),j
[k+1] · (1− λ) (9)
This form of manipulation can be used to force the competing aggregator j out of
aggregator i’s desired schedule. Obviously, this attack is very naive and can lower the
total amount of electricity allocated to the attacked aggregator j, making it relatively
easy to detect as the total amount of energy allocated to aggregator j will not satisfy its
requirements. However, in many cases, it effectively alters the energy schedule of aggregator
12
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j without actually reducing the total amount of energy. In this case, as the total amount
of energy allocated to aggregator j is not artificially too small, this deviating behaviour is
not obvious to detect.
5.2 Shift Attack
In this more sophisticated attack, aggregator i shifts the energy allocation of aggregator j to
more expensive hours (or outside aggregator i’s preferred hours) without altering the energy
quantities. This allows the deviating aggregator i to obtain its desired energy schedule at
reduced prices, as the price impact of aggregator j on the desired hours is eliminated. In this
work and without loss of generality, we will focus on a particular case where the deviating
aggregator splits the energy schedule of the attacked aggregator j by its mid-hour, and then
shifts both halves outwards by a number of hours µ = 1, 2, . . ., as depicted in Fig. 2. This is
motivated by the fact that, normally, the cheapest prices lie somewhat in the middle hours
of the day.
In more detail, let t∗ be the median hour with non-negative energy allocation for agent
j, E
(i),j
[k+1]. Then, given E
(i)
[k+1] from Eq. 7b, the allocation of aggregator j is modified as
follows:
Eˆ
(i),j
[k+1], t =

0 , if t ∈ [bt∗c − µ, bt∗c]
0 , if t ∈ [dt∗e, dt∗e+ µ]
E
(i),j
[k+1], t+1 , if t ≤ t∗ − µ
E
(i),j
[k+1], t−1 , if t > t
∗ + µ
(10)
Note that in the mathematical formulation presented in Eq. 10 the allocation can be pushed
beyond the 24h day interval for large values of µ, but this does not happen for the range of
values employed in the empirical evaluation described in Section 7.
Hour
E
n
er
gy
(a)
Hour
E
n
er
gy
(b)
Figure 2: (a) Truthful allocation from aggregator i to aggregator j following Eq. 7b, E
(i),j
[k+1].
(b) Attacked Eˆ
(i),j
[k+1] employing a shift attack with µ = 1 as given by Eq. 10.
5.3 Adversarial Attack
This last type of attack we consider is different from the two previously described ones, as the
deviating aggregator i does not directly seek to manipulate another aggregator’s allocation.
Instead, it will try to make a incriminate a benign aggregator j to make it appear as a
deviator, hoping it will be a false positive of the manipulation detection algorithm and
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penalised accordingly. Depending on the imposed penalty, this can consist on banning
aggregator j’s participation on the current trading day, thus benefiting aggregator i as
price impact is reduced. Otherwise, this can be seen as a purely malignant adversarial
attack.
This attack can be performed by proposing a schedule for aggregator j, E
(i),j
[k+1], t, closer
to the allocation of aggregator j to itself in the previous round, E
(j),j
[k] . Hence aggregator j
appears to deviate from the algorithm as it breaks the balance in aggregators i-j interaction.
This will become clear in Section 6.1 where we describe our proposed method to quantify
manipulation.
This attack can be parametrised by a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] which determines a linear
combination between the schedule proposed by aggregator j to itself, and the schedule
allocated by aggregator i to j as a result of Eq. (7a). Formally, given E
(i),j
[k+1] from Eq. 7b,
modify the allocation to aggregator j as follows:
Eˆ
(i),j
[k+1] = E
(i),j
[k+1] · (1− λ) + E
(j),j
[k] · λ
In more detail, an attack with parameter λ = 1 proposes an allocation to aggregator j
equal to what j proposed for itself in the previous round. This is likely to be beneficial
for aggregator j’s schedule, as it will contribute towards maintaining the more favourable
schedules characteristic of early rounds before convergence. However, as will be detailed
in Seciton 6.1, this will make benign aggregator j seem a deviator, with the subsequent
penalty. Conversely, as λ tends to zero, we recover the benign ADMM algorithm.
5.4 ADMM Convergence under Strategic Manipulation
As described in Section 2, existing works in the literature focus on attacks to the ADMM
algorithm that seek to destabilise it and prevent its convergence. While this can beneficial
for a malignant attacker whose objective is to prevent the algorithm’s operation, it is not
necessarily so in our case with self-interested participants. In more detail, a given EV
aggregator may want to completely prevent coordinated bidding by interrupting convergence
of the proposed coordination algorithm, but most likely it will try to improve its own
allocation by manipulating the algorithm in a subtle way that goes unnoticed. Therefore,
although in both cases deviating behaviour needs to be detected and stopped, we will
now show several examples of the effects of three proposed attack vectors in terms of the
convergence of the ADMM algorithm.
In Figure 3 we show a scenario with three aggregators, where one deviating aggregator
performs a proportional attack with strength λ = 0.83 against another aggregator. We can
see that the total cost is actually increased, while both the primal and dual residuals are
very close to the vanilla case, where all aggregators are benign. This effectively means that
the manipulating aggregator is able to actually alter the outcome of the algorithm without
affecting convergence, thus going unnoticed if care is not taken.
Next, in Figure 4, we present another scenario with three aggregators, where one devi-
ating aggregator performs a shift attack with parameter µ = 2 against another aggregator.
We can see that, in this case, although the outcome has changed resulting in significantly
higher total costs, the primal residuals do not converge towards zero, thus the algorithm will
14
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Iterations, k
Figure 3: Proportional attack to a single aggregator with λ = 0.83 in a scenario with three
aggregators.
not converge and it is easy to detect that manipulation is occurring by some agent. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, the manipulating aggregator needs to be identified and stopped
in order for the algorithm to successfully produce an energy schedule for the rest of the
benign aggregators.
0 20 40
0
Primal residual, ||r||2
Vanilla
Attack
0 20 40
0
Dual residual, ||s||2
0 20 40
Total cost
Iterations, k
Figure 4: Shift attack to a single aggregator with µ = 2 in a scenario with three aggregators.
Lastly, in Figure 5, we present the outcome of a scenario with four aggregators where
one deviating aggregator performs an adversarial attack with parameter λ = 0.83 against
another aggregator. In this case, all residuals and outcome are pretty much unaffected,
and the algorithm converges normally. However, the attacked aggregator (recall that in
this attack type the attacker tries to cheat the detection algorithm into wrongly classifying
the attacked aggregator as a deviator) will be falsely classified as deviator if the detection
algorithm is not designed carefully. This will become clear in Section 6.
We are now ready to study how strategic manipulation can be detected.
6. Detecting Manipulation
In this section, we detail a mathematical framework for quantifying the influence of a given
ADMM participant, i.e. an aggregator, onto the rest of participants. The aim is to be
able to detect outliers that are symptom of strategic manipulation in the system. This
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Figure 5: Adversarial attack to a single aggregator with λ = 0.83 in a scenario with four
aggregators.
framework is general, and can be applied to any ADMM (or variant) scenario, although we
focus on our particular case for easier exposition.
6.1 Quantifying Manipulation
The basic idea is that any group of aggregators with overlapping energy requirements should
influence each other’s schedules with similar intensity. If a particular aggregator i is self-
interested and wants to improve its allocation by deviating from the ADMM algorithm,
it will exert a heavier influence onto its competitors’ allocations. Conversely, as happens
in the adversarial attack detailed in Section 5.3, an aggregator that tries to wrongly flag
another benign aggregator as deviator would exert too little influence.
A key point is that each aggregator i produces a (local) proposed schedule for all the n
participating aggregators. Formally, following the notation from Section 4.4:
E
(i)
[k+1] =
(
E
(i),1
[k+1], . . . ,E
(i),n
[k+1]
)
Hence, this local solution proposed by aggregator i contains its own schedule, E
(i),i
[k+1], and
all the schedules for all the other participants, E
(i),j
[k+1] for j 6= i. We assume that each
aggregator, benign or deviator, is truthful about their own allocations in their proposed
local solutions. The reason for this is that every aggregator wants the best energy schedule
given their requirements, and would gain no benefit from lying about this. This suggests
that a manipulating agent would only try to modify the competitors’ allocations in order
to reduce overlapping. Consequently, we can reasonable assume these self-allocations to be
truthful, and analyse how each aggregator affects its competitors’ allocations in successive
rounds. Without loss of generality, we assume that the deviating behaviour starts from the
second ADMM round, when every aggregator has seen the proposals from each aggregator.
This allows us to focus on the first two iterations (k = 0, 1) for ease of exposition.
Formally, let d be a square matrix of dimension n, the difference matrix, storing how
much each aggregator affects its competitors’ self-proposed allocations. In more detail, every
i, j entry quantifies how much aggregator i modifies the self-assigned schedule of agent j,
and is given by:
di,j = ‖E(i),j[1] − E
(j),j
[0] ‖
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As mentioned above, we expect benign aggregators to affect each other’s schedules in a
similar way, but aggregator size significantly affects this. More precisely, there are natural
magnitude deviations in di,j and dj,i when the sizes of the benign aggregators i and j differ.
In order to overcome this issue, we normalise the matrix d employing the total amount
of energy allocated by each aggregator to itself, as a proxy to unknown aggregator size.
Thus we can write:
sizei =
23∑
t=0
E
(i),i
[0]
and the proportion of the size of aggregator i among the whole group of aggregators is given
by:
pi =
sizei∑
j sizej
Then, the normalised difference matrix, d¯, is given by:
d¯i,j = ‖E(i),j[1] − E
(j),j
[0] ‖ ·
√
pi
sizei + sizej
(11)
The employed scaling was chosen as it empirically flattens the entries of the matrix d¯
corresponding to benign aggregators, eliminating most of the dependence on aggregator
size. This is further discussed with numerical examples in Section 7.3.
Lastly, we assume that n−1 aggregators are benign and only one of them can potentially
be a deviator. This is motivated by the fact that, with a perfect detection algorithm,
there exists a Nash equilibrium in which no-one wants to deviate. Note that the proposed
detection algorithm, which we are now ready to introduce, could be extended to deal with
a general case.
6.2 Detecting Manipulation
The overall idea is to be able to detect deviating aggregators in order to penalise and
discourage manipulation. As it is usually the case in stochastic complex environments, the
aim here is to reduce false positives and false negatives, while keeping true positives and
true negatives as high as possible. In this work we consider a positive to be an aggregator
detected as deviator, and a negative an aggregator classified as benign.
As explained in previous sections, the idea is that manipulating behaviour will stand
out, as it exerts a larger or smaller influence in other aggregators allocations, compared to
the scenario’s average. Formally, one can use the normalised difference matrix d¯ defined
in the previous section in order to quantify this mathematically: manipulating behaviour
from aggregator i towards aggregator j is translated into a too large or too small entry
d¯i,j . We propose applying a threshold-based algorithm, with threshold parameter α, as
described in Algorithm 1. In more detail, the algorithm looks at the difference matrix d¯,
computes the medians of the matrix entries, and then finds the entry that deviates the most
from the median. This is done separately for off- and on-diagonal elements (as there are
intrinsic magnitude differences between d¯i,i and d¯i,j even when all aggregators are benign)
and only the highest deviation of the two is taken as final candidate. Lastly, this candidate
is classified as deviator if its deviation from the median is greater than the user-chosen
threshold α.
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The choice of threshold α is critical and we empirically study the performance of different
thresholds in Section 7.4. Also, although the presented algorithm is designed to work in
scenarios with at most one manipulating agent, by selecting the aggregator that deviates
the most, it can be easily adapted to a general scenario. The most straightforward way
would be to simply classify as deviator any aggregator i with |µ1/2 − d¯i,j | > α for some j.
This extended algorithm is conceptually the same as Algorithm 1 and will be studied in
future work.
Input : d¯, α
Output: list with the detected manipulating aggregator, if any
/* off-diagonal */
consider the off-diagonal elements: offDiag;
compute the median: µ1/2 = median(offDiag);
compute distances from each element in offDiag to µ1/2;
find max distance −→ maxOffDiag;
/* on-diagonal */
consider the on-diagonal elements: onDiag;
compute the median: µ1/2 = median(onDiag);
compute distances from each element in onDiag to µ1/2;
find max distance −→ maxOnDiag;
/* threshold-based detection */
max(maxOffDiag, maxOnDiag) −→ max;
aggregator index: index(max) −→ i;
if max > α then
deviator −→ [i];
else
deviator−→ [];
end
return deviator
Algorithm 1: Threshold-based strategic manipulation detection algorithm for a sce-
nario with at most one deviator.
We are now ready to present an empirical evaluation in order to test the performance
of the decentralised algorithm proposed in Section 4.4 and the manipulation detection al-
gorithm presented in this section.
7. Empirical Evaluation
In this section we present an analysis of the performance of the decentralised algorithm
proposed in Section 4.4 and of the manipulation detection framework specified in Section
5. This empirical evaluation uses real market and vehicle usage data from Spain. We will
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start by detailing the real data employed in the simulations, and then describe the empirical
results.
7.1 Experimental Setup
The experiment setup described in this section closely follows the case studies presented in
(Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b, 2018c, 2018a). We consider a night-time residential scenario in
which EVs arrive in the evening and need to be charged by the next morning. The EVs are
assumed to be medium-sized with 24kWh battery capacity and maximum charging speed
Pmax = 3.7kW. Moreover, charging efficiency is set to 90%.
Real market data from the Spanish day-ahead market OMIE1 is used in the simulations,
as described in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b). Specifically, for this paper we focus on trading
data from the November 2016. Similarly, real driver data from a Spanish survey is used
to determine probabilistic EV driving patterns, as detailed in (Perez-Diaz et al., 2018b).
In more detail, we employ the distribution of times for the first and last trip from and to
home, as shown in Table 3.
t0
Time 19h 20h 21h 22h 23h
Probability 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.12 0.15
td
Time 6h 7h 8h 9h 10h
Probability 0.04 0.02 0.34 0.5 0.1
Table 3: Possible arrival (t0) and departure (td) times rounded to the nearest hour, with
their respective probabilities.
Regarding energy requirements, the desired state of charge of an EV at arrival and depar-
ture times are drawn from uniform distributions as follows: SoC0 ∈ [SoCtotal/4,SoCtotal/2]
and SoCf ∈ [2 · SoCtotal/3,SoCtotal]. Consequently, the EV charging requirements range
between a large percentage of the battery (up to 75%), to a small percentage (down to
16%), accounting for long and short trips home.
7.2 Convergence Results
We start our experimental analysis by considering the convergence to the optimal solution
of the proposed decentralised algorithm without any manipulation. A key determinant of
convergence is the augmented Lagrangian parameter ρ (see Eqs. (7a), (7b), (7c)). Intu-
itively, it controls the weight that the similarity of local and global solutions has in the
local minimisation algorithms (see Eq. 7a). If it is set too large or too small, the algorithm
will not converge. For every problem, there is a range of values providing convergence, but
again, for some values it can be very slow. Also, the number of participating aggregators
affects the convergence of the algorithm: the higher the number of participants, the more
fragmented the optimisation problem is, so more iterations may be required. Thus, a suit-
able value for ρ needs to be found in order to make the algorithm converge fast, a key point
for its practical applicability.
1. http://www.omie.es/en/inicio
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Figure 6: Convergence of the ADMM decentralised algorithm to the optimal centralised
solution, for different values of ρ. (Top) Simulations with two aggregators, each
with 150 000 EVs. (Bottom) Simulations with ten aggregators, each with 150 000
EVs. Market data from 1/11/2016.
Fig. 6 shows the convergence for different values of ρ, and for two scenarios, with two
and ten EV aggregators respectively. Each plot shows how far the decentralised solution is
from the optimal solution. We can see similar convergence behaviour for the two scenarios,
although the case with two EV aggregators is faster and more uniform. These results show
evidence of good computational scaling with the number of EV aggregators, something key
for tackling larger problem sizes. Moreover, for both scenarios, convergence starts slow
for a value of ρ = 10−3, becoming fastest for a value ρ ∼ 10−5, and diverging for larger
values. This suggests that a value about ρ = 10−5 presents the best convergence for these
scenarios, although this may vary for larger problem sizes. Also, we would like to note that
these results are consistent across different trading days. Lastly, there are novel extensions
of the ADMM algorithm which include an adaptive parameter ρ and can provide faster
convergence and rule out the need for parameter tweaking (Xu, Figueiredo, & Goldstein,
2017).
7.3 Difference Matrix Normalisation Results
As described in Section 6.1, the difference matrix, d, includes natural deviations arising
from size differences between aggregators. Any detection algorithm employing this matrix
would present higher accuracy if these differences are flattened, as any discrepancies would
then come from manipulating behaviour and would clearly stand out. Therefore, we seek
a way to normalise the matrix d in order to eliminate, or at least minimise, these natural
differences.
In order to do so, extensive simulations were performed, studying a variety of scenar-
ios with different number of aggregators of different sizes, and different attacks and attack
strengths, which are summarised in Table 4. Then, we empirically tested different normali-
sation approaches. The best results were achieved by employing the normalisation given by
Eq. 11 in Section 6.1. An example of the normalisation effects is pictured in Fig. 7. In this
20
Detecting Strategic Manipulation in Distributed Optimisation
plot, the effect of the manipulating aggregator is shown in light grey, whereas the rest of
the dark grey bars correspond to benign behaviour. In the top plots, corresponding to the
difference matrix d, we can see large differences between different entries, arising from the
large size differences between the aggregators. Importantly, these natural differences are
larger that the effect of the manipulating aggregator. On the contrary, the normalised bot-
tom plots manage to nearly flatten all the natural differences, and the effect of the deviator
aggregator clearly stands out.
Although we present one example, this effect is consistent and found in all the studied
simulations. Further research to justify this normalisation theoretically and potentially
improve it is left for future work.
d
i,
j
1 2
d¯
i,
j
1 3 1 4 2 3 2 4 3 4
Aggregator number (i, j)
Figure 7: Difference matrix (top) and normalised difference matrix (bottom), d and d¯ re-
spectively, for a scenario with two aggregators of size 50 000 EVs and two aggre-
gators of size 150 000 EVs. One of the small aggregators (Aggregator 4) performs
a displacement attack with µ = 1 against the other small aggregator (Aggregator
1), displayed as light grey.
7.4 Threshold-Based Detection Results
As mentioned in Section 6.2, the choice of parameter α is critical for the usefulness of the
proposed threshold-based detection algorithm. In this section we will study this issue and
find suitable values for α. Recall that the ultimate aim is to maximise correct classifications,
i.e. true positives and true negatives. If α is set too high, we will fail to detect deviating
behaviour. Conversely, if α is set too low, the detection algorithm would be too sensitive
and misclassify benign aggregators as manipulating.
Classical tools for carrying out this type of threshold analysis include receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves and accuracy analysis (Metz, 1978). Formally, a ROC curve
plots false positive rate (FP) versus true positive rate (TP) for each value of the threshold α.
An ideal algorithm would present a curve passing through FP = 0 and TP = 1. Conversely,
a random algorithm would lie on the line of slope 1. The results for Algorithm 1 for each
type of attack are depicted in Fig. 8, using the simulations described in Table 4. We can
see that the adversarial attacks are easier to detect, followed by the displacement attacks.
21
Perez-Diaz, Gerding & McGroarty
Proportional attacks are the most challenging, specially when the attack strength λ is small.
However, the weaker the attack, the more limited influence it has on the convergence of the
algorithm. Also, note that the ROC curves do not go all the way up to 1 TP as we focus
on scenarios with at most one manipulator in this work (see Section 6.1).
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Figure 8: ROC curves for Algorithm 1 for each attack type. The dashed line corresponds
to the unit slope line, where a random algorithm would lie. The highlighted
areas correspond to the range of values of α which provide the best results: α ∈
[0.0006, 0.0356]. Note that these highlighted areas correspond to the highlighted
areas in Fig. 8.
Moreover, we also analyse the accuracy (Metz, 1978) of the detection algorithm, which
is given by:
Accuracy =
True Positives + True Negatives
Total population
The results for Algorithm 1 for each type of attack are depicted in Fig. 9. We can see that,
for all three types of attack, the proposed algorithm achieves high accuracy rates, up to
around 96%, and down to around 90%, for values of α in the range α ∈ [0.0006, 0.0356].
This range is pictured in Figs. 8 and 9 with greyed areas.
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Figure 9: Accuracy curves for Algorithm 1 for each attack type. Recall that accuracy is
defined as: Accuracy = (True Positives + True Negatives)/Total population. The
highlighted areas correspond to the range of values of α that provides best accu-
racy results: α ∈ [0.0006, 0.0356]. Note that these highlighted areas correspond
to the highlighted areas in Fig. 8.
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Attack magnitude Number of aggs. Size of aggs.
Proportional
attack
n = 3, 4, 6
ρ = 10−5
days = 10
size = 150k
λ = 0, 0.15, 0.3,
0.46, 0.61, 0.77, 0.92
n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
ρ = 10−5
days = 10
size = 150k
λ = 0.5
Aggregators=
[100k, 150k, 100k],
[100k, 150k, 150k],
[150k, 150k, 100k],
[150k, 150k, 50k],
[50k, 150k, 150k],
[50k, 150k, 50k],
[100k, 150k, 100k, 100k],
[50k, 150k, 150k, 50k]
days = 10
λ = 0.25, 0.5
Displacement
attack
n = 3, 4, 5
ρ = 10−5
days = 2
size = 150k,
µ = 1, 2, 3
n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
ρ = 10−5
days = 5
size = 150k
µ = 1
Aggregators=
[100k, 150k, 100k],
[150k, 150k, 50k],
[50k, 150k, 150k],
[50k, 150k, 50k],
[150k, 150k, 150k, 50k],
[50k, 150k, 150k, 50k]
days = 2
µ = 1, 2
Adversarial
attack
n = 3, 4, 5
ρ = 10−5
days = 10
size = 150k
λ = 0, 0.16, 0.33,
0.5, 0.66, 0.83, 1
n = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
ρ = 10−5
days = 10
size = 150k
λ = 0.5
Aggregators=
[100k, 150k, 100k],
[100k, 150k, 100k],
[150k, 150k, 100k],
[150k, 150k, 50k],
[50k, 150k, 150k],
[50k, 150k, 50k],
[150k, 150k, 150k, 50k],
[50k, 150k, 150k, 50k]
days = 10
λ = 0.5
Table 4: Description of all the simulations employed in the case study, Sections 7.3 and
7.4, separated by attack type. n is the number of aggregators, ρ is the augmented
Lagrangian parameter, days is the number of trading days employed, size is the
number of EVs per aggregator. In all cases, simulations were run twice: first with
all benign aggregators, and second where the last aggregator deviates and attacks
the first aggregator.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a decentralised coordination mechanism for multi-EV aggregator
bidding in the day-ahead market, employing an Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
23
Perez-Diaz, Gerding & McGroarty
(ADMM) algorithm. This proposed algorithm extends previous work in the literature,
which addresses the same scenario, but with a centralised framework. Specifically, the
proposed decentralised framework removes the need for the aggregators to communicate
private requirement information to the coordinator, as each aggregator solves its own local
private optimisation problem with their own requirements. This is a key feature for the
practical applicability of the proposed coordination mechanism, as real businesses or public
service providers would be reluctant to disclose this private information.
Also, we present the first study about strategic manipulation of ADMM algorithms by
self-interested internal agents. ADMM and related decentralised optimisation algorithms
are widely applied in many disciplines, but little work has focused on studying how this
algorithms can be disrupted by internal attackers. In this paper, we introduce three attacks
that a self-interested aggregator can employ in order to alter the outcome of the ADMM
algorithm for its own benefit. Also, we detail a mathematical framework which measures the
effects that different agents exert onto each other when employing the ADMM algorithm,
and propose a detection which detects manipulating behaviour, i.e. participants that do
not adhere to the vanilla ADMM algorithm and try to cheat the system. Although we focus
on an energy setting, the proposed detection framework is general and can be applied to
any ADMM setting.
In order to study the proposed algorithm and detection mechanism, we present an em-
pirical evaluation using real market and vehicle usage data from Spain. We first show the
convergence of the decentralised method to the optimal solution for two scenarios, with two
and ten cooperating EV aggregators respectively. Convergence can be achieved in around
50 iterations in the first case and around 80 in the second case. Therefore, although problem
complexity increases with the number of participants, these numbers suggest the applica-
bility of the algorithm in large settings. With respect to the threshold-based detection
algorithm, we present ROC and accuracy analyses in order to study detection capabilities
with different thresholds α. We find good detection accuracy, up to 96% for most attacks,
and down to 90% in some cases, showing that the algorithm is able to correctly identify
deviations in most cases.
Several aspects are left for future work. First, a more thorough analysis of the effects
of each of the proposed attack types on the algorithm’s outcome and its convergence would
shed more light on effective attack vectors. Secondly, studying how the detection algorithm
can be improved and extended further than scenarios with at most one potential deviator
would provide increased practical applicability. Thirdly, studying the proposed framework
in a general ADMM formulation, rather than our energy setting, may provide generalised
insights into the resilience of the algorithm.
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